Forgive me for using the blog for this purpose, but this is about the only effective way I know to make a correction of an error in an article I wrote, Stop the Spin
A reasonable assessment of the terrorist episode would begin by saying that there was a failure by intelligence agencies to communicate to law enforcement agencies the arrival of terrorists and a failure by law enforcement agencies to communicate the information within themselves. These are not new problems. The CIA, after all, failed to predict the 1967 Middle East War and the fall of the Soviet Union, among numerous other intelligence failures.
David Robarge of the CIA
that it did successfully predict this war.
I of course accept his evidence. I was simply wrong.
The article is worth reading, both as a historical synopsis and as an implicit criticism of the intelligence used to push the nation into the Iraq War:
The CIA's timely and accurate intelligence before and during the war had won Helms, literally and figuratively, a place at the president's table—perhaps the most precious commodity that a DCI could possess. It also is one of the most perishable—a painful lesson that several directors since Helms have had to relearn, to their, and the Agency's, detriment.